Executive Summary
The Intelligence Authorisation Acts (IAAs) for Fiscal Years 2025 and 2026 provide annual funding and policy guidance for the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), comprising 18 agencies focused on national security. The FY2025 IAA, enacted in December 2024 as part of the National Defense Authorisation Act, authorises $73.4 billion to address threats from adversaries like China and Russia, enhance AI and biosecurity, and reform oversight. It passed with bipartisan support but drew criticism over reduced accountability measures. Discussions also explored historical concerns about media influence, drawing parallels to past programs. As of October 11, 2025, the FY2026 IAA remains unenacted due to congressional delays, including a government shutdown, operating instead under extended prior funding. The House and Senate versions emphasise counterintelligence, OSINT, and workforce improvements, authorising $81.9 billion for the National Intelligence Program. These Acts highlight efforts to modernise intelligence amid global tensions, balanced against legislative challenges.
The Intelligence Authorisation Act For Fiscal Year 2025
The IAA for FY2025 was enacted in December 2024 as Division F of the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) for FY2025 (H.R. 5009) and signed into law by President Joe Biden on December 23, 2024. It authorises approximately $73.4 billion for the National Intelligence Program (NIP), a modest increase from previous years, to support operations, workforce development, and technological advancements.
The Act is divided into several titles covering funding, management reforms, and responses to foreign threats. Title I authorises appropriations for intelligence activities, including $650 million for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Title II provides funds for the CIA Retirement and Disability System. Title III focuses on oversight, such as improving board vetting, limiting new controlled access programs, and issuing guidelines on the collection of sensitive commercially available information, like location data.
Title IV addresses specific threats: Subtitle A requires assessments of China’s biotechnology sector and strategies for intelligence sharing on synthetic opioids; Subtitle B mandates reports on Russia’s terrorism sponsorship and the Ukraine conflict; Subtitle C expands definitions of “terrorist activity” to include groups like Hamas and ISIS affiliates, with reports on threats from ISIS-Khorasan; and Subtitle D covers risks from visa-free travel, foreign investments in U.S. land, and gangs like Tren de Aragua.
Additional provisions enhance technology and workforce capabilities, including extending public-private talent exchanges to five years, codifying the NSA’s Artificial Intelligence Security Center, and strengthening biosecurity coordination. The Act passed with bipartisan support, establishing a framework for addressing key threats and modernizing intelligence operations.
Perspectives On Media Influence And Historical Parallels
One analysis examined the IAA FY2025 through the lens of Operation Mockingbird, a CIA program from the Cold War era exposed in 1975, which involved recruiting journalists to shape media narratives. While the program was officially ended, some observers note similarities in how modern laws might enable influence operations.
The Act’s funding for countering foreign malign influence, such as from China and Russia, and its provisions for AI and data collection could potentially support media-related activities under national security pretexts. For example, talent exchanges with private-sector experts in AI and finance might facilitate narrative shaping, and guidelines on domestic data use raise questions about surveillance of public discourse. Oversight gaps, like changes to confirmation processes, could limit checks on such activities.
Critics link this to broader trends, including the 2012 Smith-Mundt Modernisation Act, which allows domestic dissemination of certain government materials. However, the Act also includes safeguards, such as whistleblower protections and biotech strategies that could expose foreign operations. This perspective highlights ongoing debates about balancing security with civil liberties and media independence.
The Intelligence Authorisation Act For Fiscal Year 2026
As of October 11, 2025, the IAA for FY2026 has not been enacted, despite the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 2025. The Intelligence Community operates under a continuing resolution extending FY2025 funding levels. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence advanced S. 2342 on July 17, 2025, and the House Permanent Select Committee approved its version on September 10, 2025, but no floor votes have occurred.
The House bill authorises $81.9 billion for the NIP, with key focuses on counterintelligence reforms, AI integration, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). Titles include authorisations for activities and retirement funds; establishment of a National Counterintelligence Center; prohibitions on certain AI apps; standardisation of OSINT training; bans on ideological bias in hiring; assessments of China’s economic power; and various reporting requirements.
The Senate version shares similar priorities but emphasizes biotech and supply chain risks. Unlike FY2025, the FY2026 IAA remains standalone and is not yet part of the NDAA, which the Senate passed on October 09, 2025.
Legislative Delays And The Government Shutdown
The delay in enacting the IAA FY2026 is tied to broader congressional gridlock, including a government shutdown that began on October 1, 2025, due to the failure to pass full-year appropriations bills by September 30. The shutdown involves disputes over spending, healthcare, and policy riders, leading to furloughs and service disruptions.
While the shutdown does not directly cause the IAA’s non-enactment—the IAA is an authorisation bill separate from appropriations—it contributes indirectly by consuming legislative time and resources. Essential intelligence functions continue uninterrupted, but new initiatives are on hold. Resolution is expected in a post-election lame-duck session, potentially by December 2025.
Broader Context
These Acts reflect the U.S. government’s ongoing efforts to adapt intelligence capabilities to an increasingly complex global landscape, where geopolitical rivalries, such as those with China and Russia, intersect with rapidly evolving technological risks like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The FY2025 IAA establishes a solid foundation by not only countering immediate adversarial threats—through targeted assessments and enhanced coordination—but also modernising operations via workforce pilots, extended talent exchanges, and safeguards against AI tampering, ensuring the Intelligence Community remains agile and resilient in a digital age.
Building on this, the FY2026 version seeks to further refine these efforts with a stronger emphasis on efficiency and accountability, including the transfer of the existing National Counterintelligence and Security Center to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, standardised training for open-source intelligence, and measures to eliminate bias in hiring practices. These provisions aim to foster a more proactive and transparent IC, capable of leveraging emerging technologies while mitigating internal risks.
At the same time, the delays in enacting the FY2026 IAA underscore persistent challenges in bipartisan lawmaking, particularly in a polarised Congress where funding disputes and policy disagreements can cascade into broader disruptions, as evidenced by the recent government shutdown. Such hurdles highlight the delicate balance required between timely national security enhancements and the democratic processes that demand rigorous debate and compromise. Despite these obstacles, the authorisation framework—supported by continuing resolutions—guarantees uninterrupted funding for core priorities, allowing the IC to maintain its vigilance against both foreign and domestic threats.
In the long term, these IAAs serve as vital instruments for sustaining U.S. leadership in intelligence, promoting innovation, and upholding oversight mechanisms that protect civil liberties. As global dynamics continue to shift, future iterations of the Act will likely evolve to address new frontiers, such as quantum computing or climate-related security risks, reinforcing the nation’s commitment to a robust, ethical, and forward-looking intelligence apparatus.