India’s economy often gets praised for growth, but everyday people aren’t feeling it. Many think lowering the Goods and Services Tax (GST)—a tax on things we buy—will help folks spend more and boost the economy. But this article explains why that’s not true for most Indians. It’s like putting a band-aid on a broken leg; it doesn’t fix the real problems. Over 800 million people get just 5 kg of cheap food each month from the government, and about 1 billion live paycheck to paycheck, barely covering basics. They don’t have extra money to spend, no matter how low taxes go.

Spending at home makes up about 55% of India’s total economy (called GDP) in 2025-26, but it’s dropping because families are drowning in debt just to eat and pay bills. Add in tiny foreign investments, money leaving the stock market, and a risky DII Bubble in stock market of India and local investments, and things look even worse. This piece breaks it down simply, using trusted non-government reports. It shows how tax cuts don’t help—they actually keep poor people stuck in a loop of borrowing and struggling.

Why Lowering GST Won’t Change A Thing For Most People

GST is a tax added to the price of almost everything, from food to phones. It hits poor families hardest because they spend most of their money on basics. Cutting it from 18% to 12% on some items sounds good, but for those 800 million on food aid or the 1 billion scraping by, it does nothing.

These folks aren’t buying extras like new clothes or gadgets—they’re just trying to survive. Their spending isn’t “fun money”; it’s debt just to get through the day. Reports from 2025 show family debt at 48.6% of the whole economy (about 150 trillion rupees), with each person’s share jumping 23% to 48,000 rupees by March. Most loans aren’t for houses or cars anymore (that’s 55% of debt)—they’re for groceries and bills because wages aren’t rising.

Think of it this way: If you earn 15 rupees a day and taxes take 10, dropping taxes to 8 rupees doesn’t give you 2 rupees extra to spend. You still owe money from before, so you use it to pay old debts. That’s why overall spending fell 6% last year, pulling its GDP share down to 55%. No extra cash means no real change.

Other big issues pile on: Family savings hit a 50-year low of 5.3% of GDP, so people borrow more. Inequality is huge—the richest 1% hold 43% of all wealth, while the poorest half pay 64% of GST even though they earn way less.

Outside money isn’t helping either. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is under 1% of GDP, dropping 99% to just 353 million dollars last year, and even lower in 2025. Foreign investors pulled out billions from stocks, and local big investors are inflating a “DII Bubble” that could pop and crash markets. This hurts city jobs and home buying, cutting demand by 2-3%.

Busting The Myth: No “2 Trillion Rupee Boost” From Tax Cuts

People say GST cuts on over 200 items in September 2025 (prospective from 22-09-2025) will “inject” 2 trillion rupees into pockets and grow the economy.

That’s misleading talk. It’s not new money—it’s just taking less tax from what little people can afford to buy. If no one can afford to buy, there’s no tax to impose by govt anyway.

Experts call this fake growth. Official numbers show spending up 7.2% last year, but it’s all from loans, hiding a real slowdown to 6% by year’s end. GST started in 2017 and now brings in 20 trillion rupees, mostly from poor folks buying basics. Big companies get huge breaks (5-6 trillion rupees), while only 7-8% of people pay income tax. It’s like a trap: taxes watch every buy, favor the rich, and keep everyone else broke.

How the Government Counts This As “Growth” (But It’s Not Real)

Officials add this “2 trillion savings” to GDP numbers like magic—assuming people spend more (they won’t) or tweaking math to look better. Real spending is falling, and much of the 55% share is from loans, not real income. Independent checks say it’s overstated by 2-3%, ignoring money leaving the country or hidden cash.

India’s total economy is projected at 315-357 trillion rupees (3.6-4 trillion dollars) for 2025, with just 4% real growth—down from 6.5%. Even 4% is possible only if Modi govt starts bringing suitable social and economic reforms in India right now unlike the lies, data fudging and Jumlabaazi that it has been doing for the past 11 years. If this Juggad of Modi govt continues, the real GDP of India would be 2.5% only in 2025-26.

Why So Low?

(a) US tariffs from August 2025 cut exports by 14-20% (20-30 billion dollars lost, 0.5-1% drag, 1-2 million jobs gone). Some breaks for drugs and tech help a bit (30-40%).

(b) Non trade barriers (NTBs) like visa rules hit services by 10-15 billion dollars (0.2-0.5% drag).

(c) Limiting Factors Inside India: Slowing spending adds 0.5-1%, declining investments 0.5-0.8%, falling and unfruitful government spending 0.3-0.5%, trade deficits -0.5% (total drag 1.5-2.5%).

Overall: 2.5-4% growth, but risks a huge drop to -38.46% contraction (with 4% actual GDP of India from fictitious 6.5 GDP of India) or -61.54% contraction (with 2.5% GDP from fictitious 6.5 GDP of India) by 2026 if nothing changes.

This -38.46% or -61.54% seems unbelievable at first glance. But do not forget that Modi govt has been indulging in data fudging and inflating the GDP of india for almost a decade now. Real GDP was never above 4%, even in the best performing year(s). So the contraction is from a fictitious and inflated GDP of 6.5 that does not exist at the first place.

From 4% to 4% GDP (-38.46% from fictitious 6.5% GDP) there is no change at all but the exposing of lies and Jumlabaazi of Modi govt. But for a 2.5% GDP for 2025-26 (diminishing -61.54% from fictitious 6.5% GDP and -37.5% from actual 4% GDP) from 4% actual GDP of India, this is a big cause of concern. The limiting factors of Indian GDP would drag GDP of India to 2.5% in 2025.26, if they are not tackled right now. Lies, fudging and Jumlabaazi cannot hide this facade anymore.

Government debt is 85% of GDP (182 trillion rupees), eating 25-30% of budgets on interest alone—no room for real help. Investments are 32% of GDP, but private ones fell to 21.5%. Official jobless rate is 8.5%, but real youth rate is 22%, killing incomes. World Bank says baseline 6.3-6.5%, but drags pull it to 2.5-4%.

A Wake-Up Call: Time For Real Fixes

India looks shiny with 4% growth talk, but it’s built on shaky ground—unfair taxes, loan-based fake spending, and outside hits like tariffs starting September 2025. Trusted reports back this: tariffs cost billions, investments slump, debt soars.

We need big changes: forgive some debts, give basic income to all, make better trade deals. Because the Indian stock market would soon witness DII Bubble Burst and Indian spending could crash really hard (with loss for 90% retail investors).

With 80 crore in food lines and 100 crore hand to mouth in India, the real story is clear—India must face facts or fall further to 2.5% GDP in 2025-26.

Year (FY)	Domestic Consumption (% of GDP)	Increase/Decrease	% Yearly Change	Reasons for Increase/Decrease	Years Inflated	Methods Used to Inflate & Years
2014-15	58.4%	Baseline	–	Stable post-global recovery; rural demand steady.	No	N/A
2015-16	59.0%	Increase	+1.0%	Demonetization prep; urban spending up slightly.	No	N/A
2016-17	58.5%	Decrease	-0.8%	Demonetization cash crunch slowed spending.	No	N/A
2017-18	57.8%	Decrease	-1.2%	GST rollout disrupted small businesses.	No	N/A
2018-19	59.1%	Increase	+2.2%	Pre-COVID wage gains; e-commerce boost.	No	N/A
2019-20	59.5%	Increase	+0.7%	Strong services sector; festive demand.	No	N/A
2020-21	60.8%	Increase	+2.2%	COVID lockdowns shifted to essentials; govt aid.	Yes (2020-21)	Overstated PFCE by 2% via lockdown-adjusted deflators; ignored informal sector collapse.
2021-22	61.2%	Increase	+0.7%	Rebound from pandemic; vaccine rollout.	Yes (2021-22)	Methodological tweaks in base year revisions; added assumed digital spending (1-2% inflate).
2022-23	60.1%	Decrease	-1.8%	Inflation, Ukraine war hit food prices.	No	N/A
2023-24	59.5%	Decrease	-1.0%	High interest rates; job losses in IT/services.	No	N/A
2024-25	58.2%	Decrease	-2.2%	Rural distress, debt squeeze; FII outflows.	Yes (2024-25)	Inflated via foregone GST “infusion” offsets (2-3%); quarterly revisions ignored Q4 slump.
2025-26 (Proj.)	55.0%	Decrease	-5.5%	Tariffs, debt bubble risk; stagnant wages.	Potential	Projected tweaks in deflators if outflows ignored.

Year (FY)	Income-Based Consumption (% of Total Domestic Consumption)	Debt/Loan-Based Consumption (% of Total)	Yearly % Change in Debt-Based Share	Reasons for Overall Changes
2014-15	75%	25%	Baseline	Low debt pre-GST; stable incomes.
2015-16	73%	27%	+8%	Early credit growth for urban middle class.
2016-17	70%	30%	+11%	Demonetization pushed borrowing for cash needs.
2017-18	68%	32%	+7%	GST compliance costs led to small loans.
2018-19	65%	35%	+9%	Rising e-commerce; easy personal loans.
2019-20	62%	38%	+9%	Pre-COVID credit boom in retail.
2020-21	55%	45%	+18%	COVID lockdowns; govt pushed digital credit for survival spending. Stagnant wages forced borrowing.
2021-22	52%	48%	+7%	Post-lockdown recovery via loans; easy RBI policies amid job losses.
2022-23	48%	52%	+8%	Inflation eroded savings; credit cards/digital wallets surged for daily needs.
2023-24	45%	55%	+6%	High food prices, youth unemployment (22%); informal jobs paid less.
2024-25	42%	58%	+5%	Debt traps deepened; convenience of UPI/apps made borrowing easy despite rising rates.
2025-26 (Proj.)	40%	60%	+3%	Continued wage stagnation, bubble risks; structural issues like poor job creation.

Why Debt/Loan-Based Consumption Jumped From 2020 Onward

The COVID-19 Plandemic (a hoax that pushed Death Shots for money) hit hard—lockdowns killed jobs and incomes, so families borrowed to buy food and medicine.

Government and banks made loans easier (low rates, digital apps) to keep the economy going, but wages stayed flat.

By 2020, informal workers (most Indians) lost savings, turning to credit cards and personal loans.

From 2021, inflation (food prices up) and slow job growth made it worse—people cut savings (down to 5.3%) and borrowed more for basics.

Easy tech like UPI sped it up, but it created a trap: more debt means less real spending power long-term.

India’s economy seems to have gotten a lot bigger on paper between 2014 and 2025. The total size went from about ₹112 lakh crore to around ₹350 lakh crore. But if you fix the numbers for things costing more (like inflation), the real growth was just okay—hardly 5% each year.

Leaders often talk it up like a huge win, but it’s more like a magic trick. It hides big problems: too much borrowing, special favors to giant companies, and the rich getting richer while the poor fall behind. Now, add tough new US tariffs on trade in 2025, and every part of the economy feels squeezed. One way to check the economy is by what gets made (like farming or services)—that looks a bit strong. But looking at what people spend money on shows big weaknesses. These two ways of measuring don’t always match (off by 0.5-2%) because of hidden small businesses and fuzzy data. This story explains it all and says a big slowdown is coming in 2025-26.

Checking Spending: What Really Makes The Economy Go (2014-2025)

Experts often check the economy by looking at spending. It’s like adding up four big buckets:

(a) What regular people buy (called C for consumption).

(b) What businesses and the government spend on building stuff (I for investment).

(c) What the government spends on running things (G).

(d) The difference between what India sells to other countries minus what it buys from them (X minus M, or net exports).

From official numbers and smart experts, all these buckets have red flags: People aren’t buying much because of lack of money, investments are stuck in debt, government spending wastes cash, and trade is losing money (deficit). Even bigger troubles: “Buddy deals” where friends of leaders get special help, government debt as big as 85% of the whole economy, corruption stealing ₹9-10 lakh crore over years, and unfairness in who has money (inequality of income-a score of 0.42, even if leaders say it’s better).

(a) The Big Picture: Real growth has been up and down at 4-5%, with early 2025 at just 4.9% from last year. This covers up “growth without new jobs” (jobless rate at 7-8%) and the richest 1% owning 43% of all wealth. The mismatch between making stuff and spending comes from the huge “informal” part of the economy (like street vendors, about 45%) that’s hard to count.

(b) What People Buy (C): This is the biggest part, 55-60% of the economy. It fell from 58.4% in 2014-15 to 56.5% in 2024-25, and could drop to 55% in 2025-26 (down 5% to ₹100.9 lakh crore). Real buying power per person rose only 3-4%, hit hard by poor rural folks (200 million people), unused help money (like 62% of a jobs program just sitting there), and families owing 48.6% as much as the whole economy. In 2025, it’ll slow growth by 1-2%, with no fast fix because prices are up 5-7%.

(c) Building and Investing (I): This is 30-37% of the economy, up from 32.4% to 36.8%, but expected at 35.8% in 2025-26 (down 5% to ₹65.7 lakh crore). Private business investing is weak (21.5% share, with 5-7% bad loans), and public ones borrow too much (spending on big projects from ₹2.4 lakh crore to ₹11.21 lakh crore, or 3.1% of economy) but waste 10-15% and help big shots like Adani or Ambani.

(d) Government Spending (G): 9-12% of the economy, up 215% on paper (from ₹16.07 lakh crore to ₹50.65 lakh crore), but real rise about 6-7% and set to drop 1.2% in 2025-26 (9.2% share, ₹16.9 lakh crore). They focus on huge projects (22% of budget), but costs go over (₹15-40 thousand crore extra on roads), corruption steals (₹30-35 thousand crore on COVID stuff, says checks), and they cut back on welfare for people (down to 20%, less per person). It’s paid by borrowing (30-40% loans, with interest taking 25-30% or ₹11.5 lakh crore), keeping the money hole at 4.4% plus secret extras. It gives quick bumps but makes unfairness worse.

(e) Exports And Imports From Other Countries (X – M): This pulls down 1-1.7% from the economy, with a gap of $100-250 billion. Sales abroad grew 50% (from $314 billion to $470 billion, thanks to some boosts), but buys are $570-600 billion. The US (18% of sales) might drop 14% from tariffs and NTBs. In 2025, it’ll drag growth by 0.5-1%, worse with oil costing 20% more (from Russia) and 20% of food wasted after picking.

Here’s a simple table to sum it up:

Part	Share in 2014 (%)	Expected Share in 2025 (%)	Main Changes (2014-2025)	Help to Growth in 2025
C (What People Buy)	58.4	55	Flat; hurt by lack of income and income inequality	+0-1% (weak)
I (Building Stuff)	32.4	35.8	Private weak; public wastes cash, FDI/FII minimum, OFDI too much	+0.5-1% (slow)
G (Government Spending)	11.5	9.2	Looks big; full of stealing and skips	+1-1.5% (not good)
NX (Sell Minus Buy Abroad)	-1.0	-1.7	Gaps bigger; hit by taxes	-0.5-1% (pulls down)
Total	–	–	Red Flag 2.5-4% GDP for 25-26; fake win, no jobs	About 4% (before bad stuff)

All in all, the economy is wobbly: People buying and building hurt by unfairness and debt, building and government by special favors, and trade by world problems. Trade troubles: $100-120 billion gap, 14% less sales to US, $10-15 billion lost from blocks (like in tech help). Stock market down 5-10% this year (as of September 2025), with overpriced stuff and foreigners pulling $5-10 billion out—signs of DII Bubble that could pop 30-40%.

What About 2025-26? What Experts Guess

Starting from a guess of 6.3-6.5% growth (from World Bank and OECD), bad pulls could cut 2.5-4 points off. So India’s growth might slow to 2.5-4% in 2025-26, with danger of dropping 38% (from 6.5% to 4%) by 2026 if economic conditions of India are not fixed right now.

Breaking it down:

(a) US taxes at 50% (from August 2025, some breaks for meds and tech at 30-40%) could cut sales 14-20%, lose $20-30 billion and 1-2 million jobs—slow growth by 0.5-1 percentage point.

(b) Other NTBs blocks (like work visas or rules) hit services by $10-15 billion, cut 0.2-0.5 percentage points.

(c) Home problems: People buying down 0.5-1%, building 0.5-0.8%, government 0.3-0.5%, and trade another 0.5% (total pull of 1.5-2.5 percentage points).

(d) Full guess: 2.5-4% growth contraction in 2025-26, with “pain in parts” risks, as news like Reuters and Bloomberg say.

Making Stuff vs. Spending Money: Why Numbers Don’t Match

One way to check is “production”—what’s made in farming (about 3% growth), factories (5%), services (7%)—average 5% growth. It looks at supply. Spending looks at demand. In a perfect world, they match after fixes, but in India they differ 0.5-2% (up to 2.5 in 2020-21) from uncounted small work, timing mix-ups, and data changes. Like, production misses daily buys, spending counts extra government piles.

Here’s a quick year-by-year look:

Year	Growth from Making Stuff (%)	Growth from Spending (%)	Final Economy Growth (%)	Difference/Why
2014-15	7.2 (Farming:1.2, Factories:6.7, Services:9.7)	C:7.0, I:6.5, G:8.0, NX:-1.0	7.4	0.2 points; small
2015-16	8.0	C:7.9, I:9.0, G:7.0, NX:-0.5	8.0	Matches
2016-17	8.0	C:6.5, I:4.0, G:11.3, NX:0.0	8.2	0.2 points; tax delays
2017-18	6.2	C:5.3, I:1.1, G:9.4, NX:-0.8	6.7	0.5 points; small biz gaps
2018-19	5.8	C:6.6, I:10.3, G:8.1, NX:-2.0	6.1	0.3 points; trade fights
2019-20	3.9	C:4.0, I:-0.3, G:4.3, NX:-1.5	3.9	Matches; before COVID
2020-21	-4.1	C:-6.6, I:-7.6, G:-1.3, NX:5.7	-6.6	2.5 points; lockdown chaos
2021-22	9.4	C:10.7, I:16.0, G:-0.2, NX:-2.0	9.7	0.3 points; bounce back
2022-23	6.7	C:6.9, I:7.3, G:0.1, NX:-3.0	7.2	0.5 points; prices up
2023-24	7.2	C:5.6, I:8.8, G:8.1, NX:-0.5	8.2	1.0 point; tax stuff
2024-25	6.4	C:7.2, I:7.1, G:2.3, NX:1.0	6.5	-1.6%; tax delays

Final Thoughts: Why These Numbers Count

World rules say spending and making should match, but India’s small differences (0.5-2%) show weak data—like missing small buys or puffing up government numbers with unsold junk.

With US tariffs and NTBs starting and stock bubbles like DII Bubble ready to burst, India’s “fake growth” could become a true mess. The answer? Real fixes to the broken system, not more talk, to get back to 5%+ growth.

Margin trading, formally known as the Margin Trading Facility (MTF) in India, enables investors to amplify their market exposure by borrowing funds from brokers to purchase securities. Regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and stock exchanges, MTF requires investors to pay only a portion of the trade value upfront as margin (typically 20-50%), with the broker financing the remainder. This leverage can boost returns but also magnifies risks, particularly in volatile markets.

In 2025, MTF has experienced explosive growth, surpassing ₹96,000 crore in outstanding borrowings by August, fueled by retail investors migrating from futures and options (F&O) trading amid regulatory restrictions. However, this surge coincides with mounting concerns, including record retail losses in derivatives totaling ₹1.06 trillion in fiscal year 2025 (a 41% increase from the previous year) and SEBI’s efforts to enhance risk management. Early 2025 market selloffs further highlighted vulnerabilities, shrinking leveraged positions and underscoring the perils of overexposure.

While MTF offers opportunities for higher returns in India’s burgeoning stock market, it demands careful navigation. We hereby explore the key risks, analyses losses based on available data and proxies, and provides mitigation strategies for investors.

Key Risks In Margin Trading In India In 2025

MTF’s leverage mechanism amplifies both gains and losses, making it especially risky in India’s fluctuating market environment. Below is a breakdown of the primary risks, informed by 2025 developments such as market volatility, regulatory reviews, and retail behavior shifts.

Risk Category	Description	2025 Impact and Examples
Magnified Losses Due to Leverage	Borrowing amplifies outcomes; e.g., 4x leverage turns a 10% stock drop into a 40% loss on investor capital.	Exacerbated by early-2025 selloffs, reducing leveraged positions. Retail investors, driving MTF to records, face vulnerability akin to derivatives losses (₹1.06 trillion in FY25). Returns must exceed 9-15% annual interest costs.
Margin Calls and Forced Liquidation	Brokers enforce minimum margins (20-25%); drops below trigger calls for more funds, or automatic sales at poor prices.	Heightened by SEBI’s MTF review, potentially raising requirements. Social media discussions note overleveraging causing “account blow-ups” during volatility.
Interest and Additional Costs	Daily compounding interest (9-18% p.a.), plus fees and taxes, erodes profits.	With MTF at all-time highs, prolonged positions build substantial costs, risky for short-term retail bets.
Exposure to Market Volatility and Timing Risks	Minor fluctuations cause major impacts; poor timing (e.g., buying peaks) worsens outcomes.	2025’s hazy markets drove MTF as F&O alternative, but selloffs amplified risks. Social media users warn against “catching falling knives.”
Emotional and Behavioral Risks	Borrowed funds induce panic selling, overtrading, or holding losses; education gaps compound issues.	Retail influx lacks MTF understanding, leading to errors amid pressure.
Regulatory and Systemic Risks	SEBI changes (e.g., upfront settlements, higher margins) curb risks but raise capital needs, reducing liquidity.	FY25 derivatives losses signal overexposure; MTF review may tighten stocks/margins, deterring small traders. Sovereign P4LO promotes risk mindfulness.

These risks are interconnected, with volatility often triggering a chain reaction of margin calls and liquidations.

Understanding Margin Trading Losses In India Up To 2025

Direct aggregate loss data for MTF is not publicly available from SEBI or exchanges like NSE/BSE, as it focuses on equity financing rather than speculative trading. Losses typically arise from mark-to-market adjustments, interest accumulation, and forced sales, making them harder to track systemically. However, market events, broker insights, and proxy data from F&O provide valuable indicators.

Growth In MTF Usage

MTF’s popularity has surged with retail participation, reflecting market optimism but increasing downside exposure.

Period	Outstanding MTF Book (₹ crore)	Key Notes
Early 2024	~50,000	Baseline growth amid bull market.
February 2025	72,634	Dip during selloffs; 14% shrinkage to ₹71,330 crore by month-end due to FPI outflows (₹61,000 crore).
June 2025	88,000	Recovery phase begins.
August 2025	>96,000	Record high, driven by retail shift from F&O; broker-specific positives (e.g., Zerodha’s profitable positions).

This growth masks vulnerabilities, as early-2025 slumps triggered widespread margin calls and liquidations.

Proxy Data: Losses In Equity Derivatives (F&O)

F&O serves as a close analog, with SEBI’s July 2025 study on FY25 revealing escalating retail losses from leveraged bets.

Fiscal Year	Net Retail Losses (₹ crore)	% Loss-Making Traders	Key Notes
FY24 (2023-24)	74,812	~90%	High speculation baseline.
FY25 (2024-25)	1,05,603	91%	41% YoY increase despite curbs (e.g., higher lot sizes); trader count down 30%, but losses per trader doubled; average loss ~₹50,000-1.1 lakh including costs.

Over FY22-25, cumulative F&O losses exceeded ₹3 lakh crore, highlighting leverage dangers applicable to MTF.

Deeper Analysis Of Losses In Margin Trading

Mechanics Of Losses

Losses in MTF stem from leverage amplification, where a small stock decline can erode significant capital. For instance, on a 3x leveraged ₹1 lakh position, a 10% drop incurs a 30% loss on the investor’s margin. Additional pathways include daily interest (e.g., ₹33/day at 12% on ₹1 lakh borrowed) and forced liquidations via brokers’ RMS during MTM shortfalls. Common errors like overleveraging or ignoring volatility exacerbate these.

Impact Of 2025 Market Events

Volatility defined 2025, with the Nifty 50 dropping 16% by February amid FPI outflows, inflation, and global tensions. This led to a 14% MTF book contraction, implying forced sales and losses. Recovery by August boosted positions, but sectors like finance, IT, and autos remained prone to corrections. Anecdotes from investors and social media posts describe MTF as a “wealth killer” during downturns.

Rough Estimates And Comparisons

Inferring from book size dips and leverage (assuming 3x average and 10-15% drops), industry-wide MTF losses could approximate ₹15,000-25,000 crore in slumps, plus ~₹9,600 crore annual interest on average books. Broker views vary—Zerodha reports profits in recoveries, but others highlight MTM risks.

Metric	F&O (FY25)	MTF (2025 Est.)
Retail Net Losses	₹1.06 trillion	₹15,000-25,000 crore (inferred from slumps and leverage)
% Loss-Makers	91%	High in downturns (e.g., 63% analogy to CFDs)
Key Driver	Speculation/Volatility	Leverage in Corrections
Trader Count	~9.6 crore (down 30% YoY)	Growing (book doubled YoY)

Regulatory enhancements like auto-pledging and upfront margins aim to mitigate, but experts call for stricter controls.

Mitigation Strategies

To counter these risks and minimise losses:

(a) Implement stop-loss orders and diversify portfolios.

(b) Maintain excess margins to avoid calls during volatility.

(c) Stay updated on SEBI rules and broker terms via official sources.

(d) Limit leverage; use MTF only for informed, short-term trades.

(e) Educate on mechanics and use scenario calculators.

Conclusion

In 2025, MTF’s record growth to over ₹96,000 crore offers leveraged opportunities in India’s dynamic market but conceals substantial risks from amplification, volatility, and regulatory shifts. While direct loss data is absent, proxies like F&O’s ₹1.06 trillion retail shortfall and inferred MTF impacts signal caution, especially for young retail investors. Prioritising risk management over speculation is essential to harness MTF without falling into the traps evident in recent market turmoil.

President Trump’s Latest Tariff Exemptions: Reshaping Global Trade Dynamics (As Of September 7, 2025)

In his second administration, President Donald Trump has continued to prioritise “America First” trade policies, implementing broad tariffs on imports to address trade deficits and non-reciprocal practices. Starting with a 10% global tariff on most imports effective April 5, 2025, and higher reciprocal rates (11% to 50%) for 57 countries like China and Brazil, these measures have been enacted primarily through executive orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). However, to mitigate disruptions to U.S. supply chains, consumers, and allies, numerous exemptions have been introduced.

The most recent update came via an executive order signed on September 5, 2025, titled “Modifying the Scope of Reciprocal Tariffs and Establishing Procedures for Implementing Trade and Security Agreements.” Effective September 8, 2025, at 12:01 a.m. EDT, this order provides zero-duty exemptions on over 45 categories of goods for “aligned partners” who commit to reciprocal trade deals, investments, and alignment on U.S. national security interests. It builds on earlier exemptions from the April 2, 2025, order while removing some prior protections (e.g., for certain plastics and aluminum hydroxide). This strategic approach rewards allies, pressures adversaries, and aims to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, which exceeded $900 billion in 2024.

Exemptions are conditional on partners concluding framework agreements, with implementation overseen by the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Updates to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) will be published in the Federal Register. Below, we detail the key elements of these exemptions, their beneficiaries, and the ripple effects, particularly on India and global competitors.

Overview Of The September 5, 2025 Executive Order

This order modifies Executive Order 14257 (April 2, 2025) by updating Annex II (exempted goods) and introducing the “Potential Tariff Adjustments for Aligned Partners” (PTAAP) Annex. It focuses on goods not sufficiently produced domestically, such as critical minerals and pharmaceuticals, while emphasizing reciprocity. Additions expand exemptions to strategic sectors, but removals subject items like resins and silicones to full tariffs. For aligned partners, tariffs can drop to zero percent, enhancing U.S. supply chain security and encouraging deals involving U.S. investments (e.g., $550 billion from Japan) and market access.

The order also aligns with other changes, such as the full elimination of the de minimis exemption for low-value shipments (<$800) on August 29, 2025, and adjustments to Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminum, and autos, which do not overlap with these exemptions.

Exempted Goods And Sectors

The exemptions cover over 45 categories, targeting essentials unavailable or insufficiently produced in the U.S. These apply globally for certain products but are enhanced (often to zero duties) for aligned partners via PTAAP. The table below summarizes key categories, specific goods, and notes.

Category	Specific Goods Exempted/Eligible for Exemption	Notes
Critical Minerals & Metals	Nickel, gold (powders, leaf, bullion), graphite, tungsten, uranium, neodymium magnets	Focuses on natural resources and derivatives; added to Annex II for supply chain security.
Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals	Generic medicines, non-patented articles (e.g., lidocaine, medical diagnostic reagents), certain chemical compounds	Includes items under Section 232 investigations; exemptions for insufficient domestic production.
Electronics & Components	Light-emitting diodes (LEDs), polysilicon, solar panel components	Targeted at high-tech; some prior plastic exemptions removed, but solar items eligible via PTAAP.
Aerospace	Aircraft and aircraft parts	Eligible for zero tariffs under PTAAP for partners.
Agriculture	Certain products not grown/produced sufficiently in the U.S.	Limited to essentials; PTAAP for partner-specific reductions.
Other	Bullion-related articles, unavailable natural resources/derivatives	Broad Annex II additions; excludes removed items like aluminum hydroxide and resins.

These exemptions protect U.S. industries reliant on imports, with imports containing ≥20% U.S. content taxed only on foreign value.

Benefited Countries And Partners

Exemptions primarily benefit “aligned partners” with reciprocal deals, avoiding the 10% global tariff and higher reciprocal rates. The table below lists key beneficiaries, exemption details, and benefits.

Country/Region	Exemption Details	Benefits
European Union (EU) Members (e.g., Germany, France, Italy)	Zero duties on 45+ categories; reduced to 15% on autos/parts; $750B U.S. energy purchases and $600B investments by 2028.	Stabilizes ~$100B annual pharma exports; prevents transatlantic tensions.
Japan	Zero duties on exempted goods; reduced baseline to 15%; $550B investments.	Boosts autos, electronics, nickel, and gold exports; enhances bilateral ties.
United Kingdom (UK)	Exempt from steel/aluminum doubling; eligible for PTAAP.	Supports post-Brexit talks; avoids higher metals duties.
South Korea	Exemptions on electronics, pharma, minerals; trade security agreement.	Strengthens supply chains for semiconductors and components.
Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam	Regional deals; exemptions on agriculture, natural resources.	Attracts manufacturing shifts; increases exports in minerals and agri products.
Potential Others (e.g., Switzerland, Australia)	Could qualify via ongoing discussions.	Savings in billions; stabilizes exports if deals finalize.

For contrast, 57 non-exempt countries like China (34% additional) and Brazil (50%) face full rates, though product exemptions apply universally.

Ongoing Product-Based Exemptions

From the April 2025 order, over 1,000 products remain exempt to protect U.S. industries. Key categories include:

Category	Examples	Exemption Rate/Details
Pharmaceuticals	Basic drugs, lidocaine, medical reagents	72-100% exempt; India’s sector noted but conditional.
Semiconductors	Chips and components	100% exempt
Metals & Minerals	Copper, nickel, gold, critical minerals	100% for copper; full for others
Timber & Wood Products	Sawn wood, raw timber, panels	87-96% exempt
Energy & Chemicals	Petroleum products, coal derivatives	95-100% exempt
Other	Lumber articles, donations, informational materials	Full exemption under 50 U.S.C. 1702(b)

Impact On India

India, not qualifying as an aligned partner due to trade imbalances and Russian oil purchases, faces a 50% tariff on most exports (effective August 27, 2025), affecting ~$60.2 billion in U.S.-bound trade. This could reduce exports by 70% in some sectors and slow GDP growth by 0.5-1%. India’s response includes GST reforms (effective September 22, 2025), simplifying to 5% and 18% tiers, tax-free insurance, and higher rates on luxuries, costing ~$5.49 billion in revenue but boosting domestic consumption.

Sectoral Impacts Are Detailed Below:

Sector	Key Impacts	Exemptions/Notes
Textiles, Garments, Footwear, & Sporting Goods	Up to 70% export drop; ~$10B affected.	No exemptions; labor-intensive jobs at risk.
Gems, Jewelry, & Furniture	Revenue losses on ~$8B exports.	Full 50% tariff.
Chemicals & Shrimp/Agriculture	Supply shifts; ~$5B chemicals and seafood hit.	Limited agri exemptions, not broadly for India.
Information Technology & Software	Margins squeezed 10-15%; growth slowed to 4-5%.	Services not directly tariffed; indirect effects.
Pharmaceuticals	Minimal; $10B+ generics protected.	Exempt under Section 232; potential expansion via deal.
Electronics & Critical Minerals	Barriers on $15B exports.	Exempt via deals, but India ineligible.

Diplomatically, tensions rise, but talks hint at potential relief if India addresses reciprocity.

How Other Countries Gain Competitiveness Over India

The exemptions create a price gap, with aligned partners’ goods entering at near-zero duties versus India’s 50%, leading to market share shifts, supply chain reconfigurations, and investment diversions. India’s U.S. exports could drop $20-30 billion annually, while competitors surge 20-40%.

Sector	India’s Vulnerability (2024 Est. Value)	How Competitors Benefit	Edge Examples
Critical Minerals & Metals	~$5-7B; 50% duties on derivatives.	Zero tariffs for Indonesia (nickel) and Japan (gold).	Indonesia undercuts by 40-50%; Japan erodes gems market.
Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals	$10B+; risks on non-exempt items.	Zero duties for South Korea and EU.	South Korea/EU generics 20-30% cheaper; squeezes India’s share.
Electronics & Components	$15B; 50% on parts.	Zero for Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea.	Vietnam diverts $5-7B; South Korea gains smartphone market.
Aerospace	$3-4B; full tariffs.	Zero for EU and Japan.	EU/Japan underbid by 30-40%; halves India’s exports.
Agriculture	$2-3B; vulnerable to duties.	Exemptions for Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam.	Competitors capture seafood; $1B loss for India.

Broader Context And Economic Implications

These exemptions shield U.S. consumers from price hikes in essentials while pressuring non-aligned nations. Beneficiaries gain 10-20% export increases, fostering alliances. Critics note favoritism toward connected firms, but the policy has stabilised supply chains. For India, short-term pain may spur diversification and negotiations. Updates could evolve rapidly—monitor White House and USTR sources for changes post-September 8.

Note: The term “DII Bubble” has been coined by Praveen Dalal, CEO of Sovereign P4LO.

When the stock market of a nation collapses, such nation tries to control it by using various methods. But all these methods are legitimate and they are not risky. However, when Domestic Institutional Investors (DIIs) are abused and pushed to prevent total collapse of a stock market, that is a recipe for disaster.

This stock market fiasco is happening in India where the prices of already overvalued, underweight and super cheap shares are inflated artificially by pushing DIIs to invest in them. In the Indian context, Modi govt is pushing DIIs to invest in companies listed at Sensex and Nifty 50, thereby helping them to maintain a stable price for their shares. In truth, the prices of such shares are less than half what has been projected and they are on ventilator of DIIs infusion. The moment that is stopped, these companies and stock market of India would collapse. This is so because the “DII Bubble” would burst beyond recovery and redemption.

Definition Of DII Bubble By Praveen Dalal, CEO Of Sovereign P4LO

The term “DII Bubble” has been coined by Praveen Dalal, CEO of Sovereign P4LO.

“DII Bubble” refers to the significant increase in investments by DIIs in a stock market that is already over valued, underweight, has negative returns and is not a favourable one to invest into. This artificially inflates prices of shares listed therein and makes it very risky says Praveen Dalal.

All these criteria are squarely applicable to stock market of India. Shares are over valued, market and shares are underweight and risky, returns are in negative and the stock market of India is least favourable one in Asia. Despite all these apparent limitations of stock market of India, Modi govt is pushing and forcing DIIs to invest in shares of top companies. This has created a “DII Bubble” in the stock market of India that could burst any time. When it would burst, DIIs (and Indians through them) would be left with mass losses that cannot be covered at all. This is one of the reasons why stock market of India would surely collapse till 2030.

As DIIs have been buying aggressively, their share in the market has surpassed that of Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs), leading to creation of a “DII Bubble” in India. This situation has become complicated due to negligible Net FDI in 2024-25.

Gross FDI inflows reached $81 billion in FY24-25 (up 14% YoY), but net FDI was near-zero due to $29.2 billion OFDI and $51.5 billion repatriation. For August 2024 (latest comparable), inflows were $6.39 billion (peak month), while outflows were $3.35 billion—highlighting a balanced but outflow-heavy dynamic.

See Also

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Outflow (OFDI) From India In 2025

With just 3% Net FDI available to India in 2025 and an increasing FII selling in the stock market of India since 2024, we are left with this “Risky DII Bubble” of the Indian stock market says Praveen Dalal.

See Also

(1) Dangers Of Long Term DIIs Investments In Stock Market Of India

Dangers Of Long Term DIIs Investments In Stock Market Of India

(2) FIIs Withdrawal From India Till August 2025 And Impact Upon Stock Market Of India

Total FIIs Withdrawal From India Till August 2025 And Impact Upon Stock Market Of India

(3) Potential Reasons For A Collapse Of The Stock Market Of India By 2030

Potential Reasons For A Collapse Of The Stock Market Of India By 2030

(4) Brutal And Total Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Decline In India In 2025

Brutal And Total Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Decline In India In 2025

Overview Of Domestic Institutional Investors (DIIs)

DIIs include entities like mutual funds, insurance companies, public sector banks, and pension funds that invest in the Indian stock market. They have gained significant influence, especially in recent years, as their share of the market has increased.

DII Market Share Growth

As of March 31, 2025, DIIs held 17.62% of the Indian capital market, surpassing Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) at 17.22%. DII holdings reached ₹71.76 lakh crore, which is 2% higher than FII holdings.

Recent Trends In DII Investments

DIIs have shown resilience despite challenges such as high valuations and foreign selling. Their inflows have been substantial:

In 2025, DIIs invested ₹5.13 lakh crore in the first eight months, nearly tripling the ₹1.81 lakh crore from 2023. Monthly inflows have varied, with significant investments in January (₹86,591 crore) and August (₹94,828 crore).

Factors Driving DII Confidence

Increased retail investor participation has bolstered DII confidence. Despite foreign selling, DIIs have maintained a strong presence, cushioning the market’s volatility.

Concerns About A Potential Bubble

While DIIs are currently strong players in the market, concerns about a bubble exist:

The Price to Earnings (PE) ratio for the NIFTY 50 index has been historically high, indicating potential overvaluation. The Market Capitalisation to GDP ratio is at a 13-year high, suggesting that the stock market may be larger than the underlying economy can support.

In other words, while DIIs are currently thriving and driving market activity, the high valuations and economic indicators raise questions about the sustainability of this growth.

When A DII Bubble Occurs

A DII Bubble occurs when sustained DII investment props up overvalued stock markets, masking underlying issues and leading to sharp corrections when the bubble eventually bursts. While DIIs, such as mutual funds, insurance companies (like LIC), and banks, have historically provided stability, their significant buying can inflate valuations, especially when FIIs are exiting due to high domestic valuations or global factors. If market realities set in, such as an economic slowdown or global recession, and these DII-managed funds face large-scale redemptions, they can quickly shift from being buyers to sellers, intensifying market declines and bursting of the bubble.

How A DII Bubble Forms

Praveen Dalal explains the process of formation of a DII Bubble as follows:

(a) FII Outflows: Foreign investors leaves the Indian market due to factors like high local valuations, rising global interest rates, or a shift to safer assets.

(b) DII Inflows: DIIs step in to buy the shares that FIIs are selling, often driven by their mandate to invest domestically or to support the market.

(c) Inflated Valuations: This sustained DII buying keeps stock prices elevated or push them higher, even when the underlying economic fundamentals do not justify these valuations or even half of their inflated prices.

(d) Bubble Creation: By masking these issues, DIIs intentionally fuel an asset bubble, where asset/stock prices far exceed their intrinsic worth.

(e) Market Correction: The bubble bursts when investors (including DIIs) realise the market is overvalued, or when external economic shocks occur. This realisation can trigger panic selling, causing market declines to accelerate.

Dangers For DIIs

(a) Losses for Long-Term Holders: DIIs, which manage funds for long-term investors such as policyholders and pension fund subscribers, are at risk of significant losses when a market correction occurs.

(b) Exacerbated Declines: If a crisis hits, and DIIs need to sell to meet redemption requests, their selling can worsen market downturns, making the correction more severe.

The Indian Context

In recent periods, particularly in early to mid-2025, DIIs have been instrumental in absorbing significant foreign outflows, helping to stabilise the Indian market and even push the overall ownership of Indian companies into DII hands. However, this strong domestic buying can also contribute to market overheating if FII exits continue, potentially creating a situation ripe for a sharp correction.

Let us now discuss in detail why a DII-Driven Bubble could be risky.

(1) Overvaluation Of Stocks

(a) DIIs have significantly increased their investments in Indian equities, with their share in NSE-listed companies reaching an all-time high of 17.62% by March 31, 2025, surpassing FIIs at 17.22%. Heavy DII buying, especially through Systematic Investment Plans (SIPs) and mutual funds, has driven market resilience despite FII outflows. However, this sustained inflow can push valuations to unsustainable levels, particularly in mid- and small-cap stocks, which have seen sharp rises.

(b) High valuations, with India’s market cap-to-GDP ratio at a 13-year high of 115% in 2021, suggest stocks may be overpriced relative to economic output. If DIIs continue to pour money into overvalued segments, a correction could wipe out gains, especially for retail investors chasing momentum.

(2) Retail Investor Overexposure

(a) DIIs, particularly mutual funds, rely on retail money through SIPs, which saw net inflows of ₹1.16 lakh crore in Q1 2025. The influx of retail investors, with 6.3 million new demat accounts added from April to September 2020, fuels speculative buying. Social media and financial influencers amplify this, creating a perception that markets only go up, which could lead to irrational exuberance.

(b) When the bubble will burst, retail investors, who often lack the expertise or risk management of DIIs, could face significant losses, eroding confidence and savings.

(3) Market Dependence On DII Inflows

DIIs have acted as a stabilising force, countering FII sell-offs (e.g., ₹55,595 crore invested in March 2020 when FIIs were net sellers). However, this creates a dependency where markets may not correct naturally, masking underlying weaknesses. If DII inflows slow due to economic shocks or policy changes, markets could face sharp declines, as seen during past FII outflows triggered by global events or tighter RBI policies.

(4) Sector-Specific Froth

SEBI’s chairperson flagged “pockets of froth” in small- and mid-cap segments, hinting at a potential bubble. DIIs have increased allocations to sectors like Consumer Discretionary (15.27% of holdings in Q2 2024), which may be overvalued due to speculative buying. A correction in these segments could ripple across the market, impacting DII-heavy portfolios.

(5) Economic And Policy Risks

High inflation, tighter RBI monetary policies, or global events like U.S. interest rate hikes could reduce liquidity, prompting DIIs to scale back investments. This could trigger a sell-off, especially if corporate earnings fail to justify current valuations. For instance, weak corporate earnings in 2024 contributed to market volatility despite DII support.

(6) Risks Mitigated By DII Characteristics

(a) Long-Term Focus: DIIs, unlike speculative retail traders, base decisions on fundamentals, economic outlook, and corporate performance, which reduces the risk of irrational price surges.

(b) Diversified Portfolios: DIIs spread investments across sectors and asset classes, minimising systemic risk from a single sector’s collapse.

(c) Liquidity Support: DIIs enhance market liquidity, ensuring smoother transactions even during FII outflows, which helps prevent panic-driven crashes.

Critical Perspective

While DII inflows have driven market resilience, the risk of a bubble cannot be dismissed entirely. The “bubble triangle” (marketability, cheap money, speculation) outlined by Quinn and Turner applies partially: trading apps and low-cost brokerages have increased market access, low interest rates have fueled investments, and retail speculation is rising. The real risk lies in specific segments (e.g., small-caps, IPOs) rather than the broader market. A sudden shift in sentiment, triggered by global shocks or policy tightening, could expose vulnerabilities.

Recommendations For Investors

(a) Focus on Fundamentals: Invest in companies with strong earnings, reasonable valuations, and sustainable growth, as DIIs do, rather than chasing momentum.

(b) Diversify: Spread investments across sectors to mitigate risks from overvalued segments like small-caps.

(c) Monitor Triggers: Watch for U.S. interest rate hikes, RBI policy changes, or weak corporate earnings, which could prompt DII pullbacks.

(d) Stay Informed: Track DII and FII activity on trusted platforms for insights into market sentiment.

Conclusion

A DII-driven bubble in the Indian stock market is a genuine and serious concern, particularly in overheated segments like IPO, small- and mid-caps, etc where valuations outpace fundamentals. Risks include overvaluation, retail overexposure, and potential liquidity shocks. Investors should remain cautious, prioritise fundamentals, and avoid speculative bets to navigate potential volatility.

The 50% tariff on select Indian exports to the U.S. applies to approximately 55-66% of India’s total goods exports to the U.S. This affects labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, gems and jewellery, garments, footwear, furniture, industrial chemicals, shrimp/seafood, carpets, and leather. Exemptions include pharmaceuticals, petroleum products, and certain electronics/semiconductors (though some face separate tariffs at lower rates like 25% for aluminium and steel). This has already caused significant loss for India.

See Also

Impact Of 50% Tariff By United States Upon Exports Of India To US

Impact Of 50% Tariff By United States Upon Exports Of India To US

However, this did not stop the increasing imports by India from U.S. Despite 50% tariff by U.S. upon Indian exports, India continued to import U.S. goods that too in more quantity than before. It seems Modi is committed to decrease the trade surplus of India from U.S. and increase the trade deficit with U.S. in 2025-2026.

See Also

Monthly Imports By India From The United States (January To July 2025)

After discussing the imports and exports position of India after the imposition of 50% tariff on Indian goods, let us discuss about the non-trade and non-tariff barriers upon Indian services that have already been imposed by U.S. and some more are in pipeline.

Alternatives To Tariffs For Services That May Be Imposed On India By United States In 2025

Substitutes for tariffs on services can include regulatory measures, trade agreements, and subsidies that promote domestic service industries without imposing direct taxes on foreign services. These alternatives aim to enhance competitiveness and protect local markets while facilitating international trade.

Understanding Tariffs And Their Impact

Tariffs are taxes imposed on imported goods, making them more expensive than domestic products. While tariffs are common in trade for goods, services are typically not subject to tariffs in the same way. Instead, countries may use other methods to regulate or protect their service industries.

Alternatives To Tariffs For Services

(a) Regulatory Standards: Countries can implement regulatory standards that foreign service providers must meet to operate domestically. This can include licensing requirements, safety standards, and quality controls.

(b) Subsidies: Governments may provide financial support to domestic service providers to enhance their competitiveness against foreign services. This can help lower costs and improve service quality.

(c) Trade Agreements: Bilateral or multilateral trade agreements can facilitate the exchange of services by reducing barriers and establishing mutual recognition of qualifications and standards.

(d) Investment Restrictions: Limiting foreign investment in certain service sectors can protect domestic industries. This can include restrictions on ownership percentages or operational control.

(e) Intellectual Property Protections: Strengthening intellectual property rights can help domestic service providers protect their innovations and maintain a competitive edge against foreign competitors.

(f) Technology Transfer Restrictions: Technology transfer restrictions can protect domestic services while not giving any leverage or advantage to foreign service providers.

So, while tariffs are not typically applied to services, various alternatives exist to protect and promote domestic service industries. These methods can help maintain competitiveness without the direct financial burden that tariffs impose on consumers.

Non-Trade And Non-Tariff Barriers Upon Indian Services By United States And Total Losses For India In 2025

From January to September 2025, the United States imposed several restrictions and measures affecting Indian services, particularly in the areas of visa policies and immigration enforcement. Below is a detailed summary of the key restrictions based on available information:

(1) Visa Restrictions On Indian Travel Agencies Facilitating Illegal Immigration

(a) Date: Announced on May 19, 2025

(b) Details: The U.S. State Department imposed visa restrictions on owners, executives, and senior officials of travel agencies based in India accused of knowingly facilitating illegal immigration to the United States. These measures were part of a broader effort to dismantle human smuggling networks. The restrictions were enacted under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which denies admission to individuals believed to have serious adverse foreign policy consequences. The restrictions applied even to those eligible for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program.

(c) Impact: The exact number of individuals or agencies affected was not disclosed due to visa record confidentiality. The U.S. Embassy in India emphasised ongoing efforts to identify and target those involved in illegal immigration, human smuggling, and trafficking operations. This policy aimed to deter illegal migration and hold facilitators accountable.

(2) Changes To U.S. Visa Policies For Indian Applicants

(a) Date: August 1 to October 1, 2025

(b) Details: The U.S. Mission in India introduced several changes affecting visa applicants:

(c) August 1, 2025: Adults were required to collect passports in person, and third-party collection was discontinued. For minors, a hard-copy consent letter signed by both parents was mandated, with scanned or emailed copies deemed invalid. An optional home/office passport delivery service was available for ₹1,200 per applicant.

(d) September 2, 2025: The Interview Waiver Program (Dropbox) was significantly narrowed, requiring in-person interviews for renewals across visa categories such as H, L, F, M, J, E, and O. Age-based exemptions for interviews were largely removed.

(e) October 1, 2025: A $250 Visa Integrity Fee was introduced for most non-immigrant visas as a refundable security deposit under strict conditions, with plans to index it to inflation from 2026. Additionally, students faced increased social media screening, and there was a potential shift from “duration-of-status” to fixed stay periods for student visas.

(f) Impact: These changes increased the administrative burden and costs for Indian visa applicants, particularly those seeking renewals or student visas. Applicants were advised to book interviews early, budget for additional fees, and ensure social media consistency to avoid complications.

(3) Travel Alerts And Restrictions

(a) Satellite Phones And GPS Devices: On January 13, 2025, the U.S. Embassy in India issued a travel alert noting that satellite phones and certain GPS devices are prohibited in India without prior authorisation. This restriction indirectly affected services involving travel and communication, as Indian authorities could seize such devices.

(b) Security and Travel Advisories: While not directly targeting Indian services, U.S. travel advisories issued in 2025 (e.g., June 18, 2025) highlighted increased caution due to crime, terrorism, and civil unrest in certain Indian regions, such as Jammu and Kashmir and northeastern states. These advisories could impact Indian tourism and related services by discouraging U.S. travelers or imposing restrictions on U.S. government personnel travel.

(4) Context Of U.S.- India Relations

(a) The U.S. actions were part of broader immigration enforcement policies under President Donald Trump’s second term, which began in January 2025. Discussions between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in January 2025 addressed migration issues, indicating diplomatic engagement alongside these restrictions.

(b) The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi repeatedly warned Indian nationals against overstaying their authorised period in the U.S., citing risks of deportation and permanent bans. This messaging targeted individuals and agencies involved in immigration-related services.

(5) Explanatory Notes

(a) The available information does not explicitly detail restrictions on Indian services beyond travel agencies and visa-related policies. For instance, there are no specific mentions of trade restrictions, sanctions on Indian IT services, or other economic measures targeting Indian industries in the provided timeframe.

(b) The focus on illegal immigration suggests a targeted approach rather than a broad restriction on all Indian services. However, these measures could indirectly affect Indian travel and consultancy firms involved in visa processing or immigration services.

What Is The Loss For India In USD Due To Non-Tariff Restrictions By US Upon Indian Services In 2025

India faces significant economic challenges from US non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on its services sector, particularly in IT and business process management (BPM), where visa restrictions like H-1B caps, denials, and processing delays limit the movement of skilled professionals. These restrictions are considered “non-trade” or non-tariff measures under global trade rules, as they affect Mode 4 of services trade (presence of natural persons). Based on various reports, the estimated loss to India in 2025 from such U.S. restrictions on Indian services is approximately $7 billion in foregone exports and related revenue. This figure accounts for reduced onsite service delivery, project delays, and higher costs for Indian firms due to visa denials and tighter immigration norms.

Background On U.S. Non-Tariff Barriers On Indian Services

(a) Key Barriers: The US imposes restrictions through H-1B visa caps (limited to 85,000 per year, with India receiving about 70-80% of approvals historically), higher denial rates under certain administrations, wage requirements, and additional fees (e.g., the $250 visa integrity fee introduced in 2025). Data localisation rules and cybersecurity requirements also indirectly impact Indian IT firms by increasing compliance costs.

(b) Impact Mechanism: Indian IT companies rely on sending professionals to the U.S. for onsite work, which accounts for 20-30% of revenue in many contracts. Restrictions force firms to hire locally (at higher costs) or offshore more work, reducing efficiency and competitiveness.

(c) Context In 2025: With heightened trade tensions and potential policy shifts, denial rates for H-1B extensions have risen to 5-10% (from 2% in prior years), affecting thousands of applications. This has led to project cancellations and lost contracts, especially in tech hubs like Silicon Valley.

(d) Sources: Estimates draw from various sources, which highlight how US NTBs add 10-15% to operational costs for Indian exporters.

Overall Indian Services Exports To The U.S.

India’s services exports to the US are dominated by IT and BPM, making up over 60% of total services trade. The total value of Indian services exports to the US in 2024 was $41.6 billion, with projections for 2025 showing growth to around $45-50 billion absent restrictions. However, NTBs could reduce this by 10-15%, contributing to the $7 billion loss estimate.

Sector	2024 Exports to US ($ billion)	Projected 2025 Exports to US ($ billion)	Estimated Loss Due to NTBs ($ billion)	% Loss
IT Software & Services	25.0	27.5	4.1	15%
BPM & Outsourcing	10.5	11.5	1.7	15%
Engineering & R&D	3.5	4.0	0.6	15%
Other Services (e.g., Telecom, Financial)	2.6	2.9	0.6	20%
Total	41.6	45.9	7.0	15%

Notes:

(a) Data derived from USTR reports and RBI statistics. Projections assume 10% baseline growth; losses based on NASSCOM estimates of visa-related disruptions affecting 15% of onsite revenue.

(b) The $7 billion loss includes direct export reductions ($5.5 billion) and indirect costs like compliance and lost productivity ($1.5 billion).

Breakdown Of Losses By Type

The $7 billion loss can be broken down by the specific impacts of US restrictions. Visa denials alone affect around 10,000-15,000 Indian applicants annually, each representing $150,000-$200,000 in potential revenue per year for Indian firms.

Loss Type	Description	Estimated Value ($ billion)	Key Affected Areas
Visa Denials & Caps	Reduced ability to deploy workers onsite, leading to contract losses or delays	3.5	IT projects in banking and healthcare
Increased Compliance Costs	Higher fees (e.g., $215 registration + $250 integrity fee) and legal expenses	1.5	All IT/BPM firms with US clients
Project Offshoring/Relocation	Forced shift to offshore models, lowering margins by 10-20%	1.0	Software development and consulting
Opportunity Costs	Lost new contracts due to perceived risks from US policies	1.0	Emerging tech like AI and cloud services
Total		7.0

Notes: Opportunity costs are calculated based on historical data where 20% of potential deals were lost due to visa issues (per NASSCOM surveys). Compliance costs have risen 20% in 2025 due to new rules.

Mitigation Strategies For India

To offset these losses, India is pursuing:

(a) Bilateral talks to ease visa norms under the US-India Trade Policy Forum.

(b) Diversification to markets like Europe and Asia, where IT exports grew 15% in 2025.

(c) Domestic reforms, such as skilling programs to reduce reliance on onsite work.

(d) Potential retaliation, like increasing tariffs on U.S. services imports, though this risks escalation.

If restrictions intensify, losses could rise to $10 billion by 2026.

There is limited direct data available specifically detailing domestic consumption trends in India from January to September 2025. However, several sources point to a broader context of declining domestic consumption during this period, driven by multiple economic and structural factors. Below is a synthesis of the available information, focusing on the decline in domestic consumption and its causes, with projections and insights where applicable.

Key Points On Domestic Consumption Decline (January–September 2025)

(1) Evidence Of Consumption Decline

(a) Private Consumption Share Of GDP: Domestic consumption, which accounts for approximately 60–61% of India’s GDP, has shown signs of weakening. Private consumption dropped from 58.1% of GDP in FY22 to 55.8% in FY24, reflecting a downward trend that likely continued into 2025.

See Reasons Why Domestic Consumption Is Declining In India

Reasons Why Domestic Consumption Is Declining In India

(b) Quarterly Data: Private consumption growth slowed to 6.0% year-on-year in the October–December 2024 quarter, marking the weakest expansion since October–December 2023, suggesting a potential continuation of subdued growth into early 2025.

(c) Decoupling From GDP: Since March 2023, consumer spending has decoupled from national output, indicating a structural decline in consumption relative to overall economic growth.

(d) Sector-Specific Indicators: Declines in automobile sales and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) revenues further illustrate weakening consumer demand. For example, domestic aviation traffic dropped by nearly 3% in July 2025 compared to July 2024, reflecting seasonal and structural factors like reduced airline capacity.

(2) Factors Driving The Decline

(a) Inflation And Purchasing Power: Rising inflation, particularly in food prices (averaging above 8% due to weather-related issues), has eroded consumer purchasing power, especially for lower-income groups. This has led to a shift toward essential spending over discretionary items.

(b) Unemployment Monster Of India: Unemployment in India has increased significantly across all segments. Whether it is IT, e-commerce, startups, private companies or any other segment, there are only news of layoff and no new employment and recruitment. Govt jobs have gone for the past 5 years and all we have is lies and empty promises of Modi govt.

See Also

The Great Unemployment Monster Of India Is Engulfing Indian Youth

The Great Unemployment Monster Of India Is Engulfing Indian Youth

(c) Stagnant Wage Growth: Real wage growth for urban Indians has remained stagnant, falling below the 10-year average, limiting spending capacity.

(d) Increased Savings And Debt: Post-pandemic household debt and rising interest rates have prompted urban consumers to prioritise savings and loan servicing over spending.

See Also

(i) Household Debt And Domestic Consumption In India In 2025

Household Debt And Domestic Consumption In India In 2025

(ii) Household Debt-To-GDP Ratio In India In 2025

Household Debt-To-GDP Ratio In India In 2025

(e) Economic Uncertainty And Consumer Confidence: Increased uncertainty about future income has led to cautious consumer behavior, with urban households cutting back on expenditures after a post-pandemic spending boom.

See Also

(i) Indian Economy Is In Very Bad Shape And Soon Stock Market Of India Would Collapse Completely Says Praveen Dalal

Indian Economy Is In Very Bad Shape And Soon Stock Market Of India Would Collapse Completely Says Praveen Dalal

(ii) Indian Economy Is A Gig Economy And Economy Of NWO Puppets And Govt Buddies

Indian Economy Is A Gig Economy And Economy Of NWO Puppets And Govt Buddies

(f) Structural Issues: Long-term challenges, such as a large informal workforce, volatile incomes, and failure to create a robust domestic market, have contributed to a chronic consumption demand crunch.

(g) Government Spending Pullback: A reduction in government expenditure, a key economic driver in recent years, has further dampened demand.

(3) Sectoral And Regional Variations

(a) Rural vs. Urban Consumption: While rural demand showed signs of revival in 2025, urban consumption faced constraints due to income stagnation and inflation. The share of food expenditure in rural areas dropped to 46.4% in 2022–23 from 53% in 2011–12, while non-food expenditure rose to 53.6%. Urban areas saw food expenditure decline to 39.2% and non-food rise to 60.8% over the same period, indicating a shift in spending patterns.

(b) Specific Sectors: The decline in sugar consumption (from 25.10 LMT in September 2024 to an allocated quota of 23.5 LMT for September 2025) suggests cautious demand despite upcoming festivals. The aviation sector’s passenger drop in July 2025 also points to reduced discretionary spending.

(4) Government Response And Policy Measures

(a) Tax Cuts To Boost Consumption: In August 2025, the government announced plans to slash consumption taxes by October, moving most items from 12% and 28% GST slabs to 5% and 18%, aiming to stimulate demand. These cuts, implemented from September 22, 2025, are expected to boost sales of FMCG and consumer electronics.

However, in the absence of purchasing power of Indians and a cautious approach of Indian consumers, reduction in GST would not have any effect. 100 crore Indians cannot spend any money on anything beyond basis necessities. There is nothing that tax or GST can do in such a situation says Praveen Dalal.

(b) Monetary Policy: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) implemented a 100-basis-point rate cut over three consecutive meetings by June 2025, aiming to drive credit growth and consumer spending.

(c) Budget 2025 Focus: The Union Budget 2025 emphasised boosting consumption through tax exemptions and fiscal measures while maintaining fiscal prudence, targeting a fiscal deficit of 4.4% of GDP for FY 2025–26.

(5) Projections And Outlook

(a) Forecasted Consumer Spending: Total consumer spending in India is projected to remain sluggish and it may even decline despite tax and GST concessions. Modi govt has failed to shown any proof of actual and overall economic development. India is facing acute poverty, hunger, unemployment, slowing domestic consumption, stock market crash, collapse of small businesses and MSMEs, negative effects of 50% tariff by United States, etc.

See Also

Impact Of 50% Tariff By United States Upon Exports Of India To US

Impact Of 50% Tariff By United States Upon Exports Of India To US

(b) Corporate Earnings: Corporate earnings of Indian companies are already low and with 50% tariff by U.S. they would plunge further in 2025. This is not an encouraging factor but a very disturbing and discouraging factor for Indian consumers, forcing them to save more and spend less says Praveen Dalal.

(c) Economic Growth: Economic growth and GDP of India may hit badly due to global issues and geo-political factors, especially tariffs. Labour intensive industries of India are already hit hard by 50% tariff and many have closed their business and laid off their employees. With a focus upon selective economic fields like IT, electronics, pharmaceuticals, oil and gas, heavy machinery, etc, Modi govt has sacrificed small businesses and MSMEs with 50% tariff says Praveen Dalal.

(d) Stock Market Debacle: Stock market of India is under continuous pressure and it has totally failed to provide profits to investors. In fact, as on date, the stock market of India is considered to be worst one in Asia to invest in. It is accepted by many experts that the situation would remain negative till 2030 and there is little hope for the revival of Indian stock market. Occasional highs may be witnessed due to optimistic news but they would fade away soon when they would face the ground realities of India says Praveen Dalal.

See Also

(i) Potential Reasons For A Collapse Of The Stock Market Of India By 2030

Potential Reasons For A Collapse Of The Stock Market Of India By 2030

(ii) Dangers Of Long Term DIIs Investments In Stock Market Of India

Dangers Of Long Term DIIs Investments In Stock Market Of India

(iii) Total FIIs Withdrawal From India Till August 2025 And Impact Upon Stock Market Of India

Total FIIs Withdrawal From India Till August 2025 And Impact Upon Stock Market Of India

India would be lucky to hit even 5% GDP in these circumstances says Praveen Dalal.

Conclusion

Domestic consumption in India from January to September 2025 continued to face downward pressure due to inflation, stagnant wages, economic uncertainty, and structural challenges. Policy interventions like tax cuts and monetary easing aim to reverse this trend, with early signs of rural demand revival offering some optimism. However, comprehensive data for the exact period is sparse, and the decline appears to be part of a broader, ongoing trend rather than a sharp, isolated drop.

It is safe to conclude that domestic consumption in India would continue to decline in 2025-2026 unless there is a bigger, better and overall development of India says Praveen Dalal.

The 50% tariff on select Indian exports to the U.S. (a combination of the initial 25-26% reciprocal tariff imposed in April 2025 and an additional 25% punitive tariff effective August 27, 2025) applies to approximately 55-66% of India’s total merchandise exports to the U.S. This affects labor-intensive sectors such as textiles, gems and jewellery, garments, footwear, furniture, industrial chemicals, shrimp/seafood, carpets, and leather. Exemptions include pharmaceuticals, petroleum products, and certain electronics/semiconductors (though some face separate tariffs at lower rates like 25% for aluminium and steel).

Based on available data, the actual impact on exports during January to September 2025 is limited because the full 50% tariff only took effect in late August. However, the initial tariff from April contributed to a noticeable decline in overall exports starting then. Projections from various reports indicate that exports in the affected sectors are expected to decline by 70% due to the 50% tariff, potentially reducing their value from about $60.2 billion to $18.6 billion annually. Overall Indian exports to the US could fall by 43% in the coming year, but for the specific period of January to September 2025, the cumulative decline in affected exports is estimated at 25-35% from the pre-tariff peak (March 2025), based on monthly trends and early tariff effects, with further drops anticipated in September data once available.

Monthly Exports From India To The U.S. (January To July 2025)

Data is sourced from US Census Bureau and Indian Ministry of Commerce reports (in USD billion; August and September data not yet released as of September 3, 2025). Note the peak in March before the initial tariff, followed by a steady decline.

Month	Exports (USD Billion)	Percentage Change from Previous Month
January	8.15	–
February	8.35	+2.45%
March	11.19	+34.01%
April	10.02	-10.46%
May	9.44	-5.79%
June	9.15	-3.07%
July	8.01	-12.46%

Cumulative exports from January to July 2025: approximately $64.31 billion. If August exports (pre-tariff for most of the month) are estimated at $7.5-8.0 billion and September at $6.5-7.0 billion (accounting for full tariff impact), the total for January to September could be $78-79 billion, reflecting a ~25% decline from a projected no-tariff baseline of ~$100 billion (extrapolated from FY25 trends).

Also See

(1) Estimated Exports By India To United States From January To September 2025

Estimated Exports By India To United States From January To September 2025

(2) IPhone Exports From India To The United States In 2025

IPhone Exports From India To The United States In 2025

(3) Monthly Imports By India From The United States (January To July 2025)

See Here

Countries Substituting/Replacing India For Tariffed Items

The high tariffs make Indian goods less competitive, leading U.S. buyers to shift sourcing to lower-tariff or tariff-free alternatives. Key countries benefiting include:

(1) Vietnam: Gaining in textiles, garments, footwear, and electronics (e.g., shirts costing $12 vs. India’s tariff-inflated $16.40).

(2) Bangladesh: Replacing in apparel, textiles, and shrimp/seafood (e.g., shirts at $13.20).

(3) Mexico: Benefiting from USMCA advantages in textiles, auto components, and furniture.

(4) China: Despite its own tariffs, competitive in chemicals, jewellery, and textiles (e.g., shirts at $14.20).

(5) Turkey: Taking share in carpets, textiles, and jewellery.

(6) Pakistan and Nepal: Emerging in textiles and leather goods.

(7) Guatemala and Kenya: Niche gains in apparel and seafood.

These shifts could become permanent if tariffs persist, as competitors lock in supply chains. For example, US shrimp imports from India may drop significantly, with Bangladesh and Vietnam filling the gap due to lower costs.

Related Stories

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(3) Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing Is Shifting To U.S. In 2025

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Cotton Production In India And Impact Of U.S. Tariff Upon Indian Cotton Agriculture

The value of iPhone exports from India to the United States in 2025 is not fully detailed for the entire calendar year in this article, but available data allows for an informed estimate based on specific periods and trends.

Key Data Points

(1) Fiscal Year 2024-25 (April 2024 to March 2025): Apple exported iPhones worth $17.47 billion (Rs. 1,50,000 crore) from India in FY25, with approximately 75% of these exports directed to the U.S., equating to $13.1 billion (Rs. 85,880 crore).

In the first quarter of FY25 (April to June 2024), iPhone exports were valued at $4.4 billion, with 97% going to the U.S., or roughly $4.27 billion. This includes $3.2 billion by Foxconn alone from March to May 2025, with 97% ($3.1 billion) shipped to the US.

A record $2.33 billion was exported in March 2025 alone to build US inventory.

(2) First Half Of 2025 (January To June 2025): iPhone exports surged by 53% year-over-year, crossing 20 million units, with over 75% of export volumes (approximately 15 million units) destined for the U.S. The value of Indian-made smartphones shipped to the U.S. in this period was $9.35 billion, with iPhones dominating due to Apple’s significant share.

Specifically, in April 2025, iPhone shipments to the US rose 76% year-on-year, reaching approximately 3 million units valued at roughly $1.5 billion (based on an estimated average price per unit derived from annual figures).

(3) April To July 2025: Apple’s iPhone exports rose 63% to $7.5 billion, contributing to India’s total smartphone exports of $10 billion in this period. Assuming 75-97% of these were US-bound (consistent with earlier trends), the value to the US was approximately $5.63 billion to $7.28 billion.

Estimation For January To September 2025

(a) January To March 2025: As part of FY25, exports to the US were likely around $4.5 billion, based on the quarterly record of $6.4 billion in Q4 FY25 (January to March 2025), with 75% directed to the US.

(b) April To June 2025: Approximately $4.27 billion, as noted above for Q1 FY25.

(c) July To September 2025: No specific monthly data is available and we cannot estimate based on earlier months trend due to 50% tariff and potential removal of tariff exemptions.

Total Estimate (January to September 2025): Combining these, iPhone exports to the US likely ranged from $9 billion to $11 billion at most.

Full-Year Estimate For 2025

Assuming a slower growth rate in the second half due to an existing 50% US tariff and removal of exemption from semiconductors and other electronic equipment by U.S., exports for July to December could not conservatively align with the first half’s monthly average. So export to U.S. would be significantly impacted from September to December 2025, especially when Trump has hinted on retaining 50% tariff and putting new ones on pharmaceuticals, furniture, semiconductors, electronic items, etc in near future.

Thus, a full-year estimate for 2025 could be $13 billion, though tariffs and removal of exemptions may reduce this to around $10 billion to $11 billion if export growth slows.

The estimates account for Apple’s dominance in India’s smartphone exports (75% of total smartphone exports) and the high proportion (75-97%) directed to the US, driven by tariff advantages over China (10% tariff for India vs. 55% for China). But now India is facing a 50% tariff and a very potential threat of removal of tariff exemptions, this would severely curtail India’s export of iPhone to U.S. from September 2025 onwards says Praveen Dalal.

Tariff Exemptions

Currently, iPhones exported from India to the U.S. are exempt from tariffs due to existing exemptions for semiconductor-powered devices. However, this situation could change if the exemptions are lifted in the future. The exemption for iPhones are temporary and could change if the U.S. reviews its tariff policies, particularly concerning semiconductors.

If the exemptions are lifted in the future, iPhones manufactured in India could face higher prices compared to those made in other countries like Vietnam or China. The U.S. Commerce Department is currently reviewing sectors deemed vital to national security, which may affect future tariff decisions.

There is no direct data in the provided references for India’s exports to the United States specifically from January to September 2025. However, some sources provide partial or related information that can help piece together an estimate or context for this period.

Key Points from Available Data:

(1) Quarterly Data (January to March 2025): From January to March 2025, India exported goods worth $27.7 billion to the United States, as reported by the United States Census Bureau. This figure is from a source indicating a strong first quarter, with a record high of $11.2 billion in March 2025 alone.

(2) Annual Context for 2024-25: For the fiscal year 2024-25 (April 2024 to March 2025), India’s total merchandise exports to the US were approximately $86.5 billion, with a trade surplus of $41.2 billion. For April to November 2024, India’s exports to the US were reported at $52.95 billion, covering major sectors like engineering goods ($12.33 billion), electronic goods ($6.79 billion), drugs and pharmaceuticals ($6.34 billion), and gems and jewelry. These figures suggest that the remaining months (December 2024 to March 2025) contributed significantly to the annual total, with December 2024 alone recording $7.017 billion in exports.

(3) Challenges Due to Tariffs: Starting in April 2025, the US imposed a 26% additional tariff on Indian goods (excluding pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and certain energy products), which could impact export performance in later months of 2025. A report projects a $5.76 billion decline in India’s merchandise exports to the US for the full year of 2025 due to these tariffs, particularly affecting sectors like electronics, seafood, and gold.

An additional 25% tariff was imposed in August 2025 due to India’s purchases of Russian oil, bringing the combined tariff to 50% for affected goods, potentially threatening $48.2 billion in exports.

Estimation For January To September 2025

Since exact monthly data for January to September 2025 is unavailable, we can make an informed estimate based on the quarterly data and annual trends:

(a) The first quarter (January to March 2025) contributed $27.7 billion.

(b) For April to September 2025, no specific monthly breakdown is provided, but we can extrapolate from the April to November 2024 figure of $52.95 billion over 8 months, which averages roughly $6.62 billion per month. Assuming a similar monthly export rate for April to September 2025 (6 months), exports could be approximately $39.72 billion (6 months × $6.62 billion). However, this assumes no significant disruption from the April 2025 tariff hikes.

(c) Adjusting for the reported tariff impact, a 6.41% decline in exports for 2025, which could reduce the monthly average slightly. If we conservatively estimate a 5% reduction due to tariffs, the monthly average might drop to around $6.29 billion, leading to approximately $37.74 billion for April to September 2025.

Total Estimate For January To September 2025

Combining the first quarter ($27.7 billion) with an estimated April to September ($37.74 billion), India’s exports to the US from January to September 2025 could be approximately $65.44 billion. This is a rough estimate, as tariff impacts and sector-specific exemptions (e.g., pharmaceuticals and electronics) could alter the actual figures.

Key Sectors

Based on data for 2024-25, the major export categories to the US include:

(a) Engineering Goods: ~$12.33 billion (April-November 2024), though expected to decline in 2025 due to tariffs.

(b) Electronic Goods: ~$6.79 billion (April-November 2024), though expected to decline in 2025 due to tariffs.

(c) Pharmaceuticals: ~$6.34 billion (April-November 2024), largely exempt from additional tariffs, but tariffs may apply soon and expected to decline once tariffs are implemented.

(d) Gems and Jewelry: ~$6.28 billion (April-November 2024), projected to significantly decline in 2025.

(e) Textiles: ~$3.32 billion (April-November 2024), though expected to decline significantly in 2025 due to tariffs.

The estimate is speculative due to the lack of specific monthly data for April to September 2025 and the unpredictable impact of US tariffs. The actual value could be lower if tariff effects are more severe or higher if India mitigates losses through trade negotiations or diversification.